An Israeli Assessment of the 12 Day War
Summary: Israeli Think Tank paper: 4 Strategies for Overthrowing the Regime
This is a policy paper from the INSS, The Institute for National Security Studies: the leading Israeli national security policy think tank.
I’ve summarized and highlighted it for reader convenience.
Tim’s Note:
While the paper notes that Israel desired to change the government of Iran, this was not an officially state goal during the 12-Day War because stating so openly is inadvisable because it delegitimates those Iranians trying to overthrow their government. Israel tried to stir up a popular uprising rising in the streets, but it didn’t work. The attacks backfired as there was a “rally around the flag” effect.
Policy Paper, July 29, 2025
Introduction (original)
Israel did not make regime change a declared objective in its recent war with Iran; however, certain Israeli actions were clearly aimed at weakening the foundations of the Islamic Republic and encouraging the Iranian public to reignite their popular protest movement. As the dust settles, not only is there no evidence that Israel’s actions advanced this goal, but it seems that they may even have had the opposite effect (at least for the time being). Currently, several main scenarios could unfold in Iran’s domestic arena: the continuation of the political status quo until the expected leadership change following the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei; regime change through a popular uprising; or internal change within the regime through a takeover (formal or de facto) by military-security elite forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), of Iran’s leadership. Although regime change remains a possibility, and perhaps even a desirable outcome for Israel, given the Islamic Republic’s continued threats against Israel’s national security, it is ultimately an outcome beyond Israel’s control. If regime change does occur, it will stem from the will and agency of the Iranian people. (Emphasis with bold & italics added by Tim. Read more original)
However, it is clear that some of Israel’s actions, especially during the second week of the war, were intended to undermine the regime’s foundations and encourage the Iranian public to take to the streets and resume their popular protest movement. Moreover, these actions presumably would have continued and perhaps even intensified had the war not ended in a ceasefire after 12 days. It is safe to assume that the issue of regime change in Iran has not been laid to rest, and Israel may renew its efforts to weaken the regime in the event of renewed hostilities between the two countries. The situation would likely flare up if Iran were to take steps to reconstitute its capabilities, particularly in the nuclear field. In such a scenario, Israeli decision-makers may face the question of whether to act in a way that could harm the very survival of the Iranian regime and perhaps even lead to its downfall, for example, by targeting critical national infrastructure and additional regime symbols.
4 Strategies for Overthrowing the Regime
Decapitation of the ruling elite, involving a swift military operation aimed at eliminating senior regime officials, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, his inner circle, and senior political and military leaders. The elimination of several dozen top officials in the opening phase of an operation could destabilize the regime in Tehran and create conditions that may lead to political change.
A covert campaign to promote regime change, led by military, security, or political actors in Iran in cooperation with other power centers such as civil society organizations, labor unions, and ethnic and linguistic minorities, with external financial, organizational, logistical, and even military support to promote regime collapse.
Encouragement, organization, and support of opposition groups in exile, preparing such groups for a rapid return to Iran and a takeover of the regime’s power centers should a revolutionary movement emerge within the country.
Provision of assistance and support to ethnic and linguistic minorities, including encouraging separatist tendencies and internal fragmentation in Iran to undermine the regime and promote political change.
Iran’s Domestic Arena: Four Possible Scenarios
At this stage, the war does not appear to have caused any significant changes in Iran’s internal dynamics or in the deep-rooted nature of the Islamic Republic. However, the war may serve to accelerate existing processes of internal change. It is therefore incumbent upon us to examine the main possible scenarios in Iran’s domestic arena in the coming years, as a basis for discussing the potential for political transformation and for formulating policy recommendations for Israel. The four main scenarios of what may unfold domestically in Iran are:
Continuation of the political status quo until leadership transition. In the absence of regime change, the Islamic Republic is likely to maintain its current trajectory until the eventual death of its supreme leader and the transition of leadership in the future. The regime is expected to continue facing a series of major internal challenges. These include an intensifying crisis of legitimacy, growing economic strains, and additional problems such as government mismanagement, difficulties in decision-making on critical economic matters, systemic corruption, ecological issues, water and electricity shortages, and a demographic crisis due to an aging population. The continuation of these problems, both in the period leading up to and following Khamenei’s eventual death, could push the Islamic Republic into a gradual decline. This process could ultimately result in internal collapse, similar to the final years of the Soviet regime, when the ruling system formally remained in place but had ceased to function effectively.
Khamenei’s death, or the end of his tenure under other circumstances, may lead to the appointment of a conservative or hardline successor who continues his path. Alternatively, a more pragmatic or reformist figure, such as former president Hassan Rouhani or Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, could come to power. This could occur either as a deliberate attempt to preserve the Islamic Republic through reform and moderation or due to a shift in the new leader’s positions, similar to the evolution seen under Khrushchev or Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union.
Regime change through a popular uprising. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out and may depend on an unpredictable trigger, there is currently no indication of an immediate or significant threat to the regime’s stability. As previously discussed, the intensification of repression following the war may further reduce the likelihood of political change via a popular uprising. Regime change in Iran is only possible through a shift in the balance of power between those advocating for revolutionary change and those seeking to preserve the political status quo at all costs. This process could lead to the regime’s gradual erosion until it collapses, if the circles surrounding the regime lose faith in its vitality and its ability to use its repressive tools to maintain its long-term survival. Currently, the regime still enjoys significant support from its security and law enforcement apparatus, particularly the IRGC, the Basij, and law enforcement forces. However, the question of loyalty of these forces to the regime will become critical as its erosion accelerates. A turning point may occur if it becomes clear that parts of the security apparatus refuse to participate in acts of repression.
In addition, it should be noted that recent waves of protests in Iran have not relied on organized leadership or formal opposition structures but rather on a deep shift in the consciousness of the younger generation. This generation is defined by both a new personal and national identity that distances itself from both religious and state institutions and poses a continuous challenge to the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. These deep-rooted trends, relating to gender, authority, personal freedoms, and exposure to global influences, cannot be suppressed through traditional methods alone. In the future, they could form the foundation of a broad, cross-sectoral movement that is not necessarily based on an alternative ideology but rather on a new language of belonging and protest.
Power shift within the regime through military-security takeover. Such a change, led by the country’s military-security establishment, particularly the IRGC, could involve removing the supreme leader or appointing a weak figurehead intended to provide legitimacy while remaining fully controlled by the IRGC. This scenario is more likely to emerge if the regime perceives growing instability or following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. From Israel’s perspective, this would not necessarily be a positive development. A regime dominated by the IRGC could become even more authoritarian, aggressive, and hardline than the current leadership.
Many members of the IRGC, especially veterans of the Iran–Iraq war who were not significantly exposed to Western education or influence, are identified with Iran’s conservative-hardliner camp. When it comes to foreign policy, they often adopt a hawkish, nationalist, and defiant approach toward the West, which could affect Iran’s policy on key foreign policy issues, including the nuclear program, regional ambitions, its stance toward the United States and its Arab allies, and Israel.
Conversely, it can be argued that the IRGC may be more committed to the pragmatic interests of their organization rather than to ideological and revolutionary ideals. Additionally, the IRGC, which is not a monolithic entity, may be more prone to internal power struggles and conflicts compared to the current regime, which generally enjoys a relatively high level of internal cohesion. A change within the regime may catalyze a series of events that would eventually lead to regime change, as occurred during the third wave of democratization in Latin America in the 1980s. In several cases, military-led regimes that replaced authoritarian governments were also eventually replaced, at least temporarily, by democratic rule. In addition, a military regime led by the IRGC might not enjoy the same legitimacy among the Shiite communities outside of Iran as does the current Supreme Leader Khamenei, potentially weakening the so-called “axis of resistance.”
“The Joe Biden Option” (Tim’s heading)
De facto leadership shift without formal regime change. Another possible scenario, which can be seen as a variation of scenario 1 or 3, involves the de facto rule of another actor who takes over the leadership of the state without officially changing the regime’s structure. In this scenario, the supreme leader ceases to function effectively due to physical decline, cognitive ailments, or a political decision. In an effort to preserve political stability, avoid a succession struggle, and prevent the appearance of weakness both internally and externally, de facto control passes to another actor (a senior IRGC commander, a senior politician, or some form of collective leadership) who manages the country behind the scenes. Outwardly, the appearance of political continuity and functioning institutions is maintained, but the center of gravity shifts to actors who are not elected and operate outside the constitutional framework. Strategic decisions are then made by other forces, without public accountability or institutional oversight. This scenario could pose a challenge in understanding the decision-making processes in Tehran, as the visible power structure would no longer reflect the actual centers of power.
Conclusion
Regime change in Iran is a possible solution, and perhaps the only sustainable way forward, given the series of threats posed by the Islamic regime to Israel, the region, and the international community. Overthrowing the Islamic regime is thus a worthy goal not only for the State of Israel, the region, and the West but also for the citizens of Iran themselves. However, regime change largely depends on factors outside of Israel’s control and on a catalyst whose prediction is elusive and may never materialize.
A change in the regime, or an internal shift such as the rise of more pragmatic elements or a takeover by the IRGC, would not necessarily alter Iran’s core strategic objectives. These include the pursuit of regional hegemony, support for non-state actors in the Arab Middle East, and the advancement of its nuclear goals that, in some cases, predate the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, such a change could lower the priority of hostility toward Israel in Iran’s overall strategy, reduce the regime’s ideological commitment to Israel’s destruction, and make it more difficult for a new leadership to maintain the ideological-Shiite axis in the region that has been cultivated under Khamenei’s rule.
Regime change depends primarily on factors beyond Israel’s control, chiefly the Iranian people themselves. Relying on a popular uprising is not a sound policy direction, as the timing, likelihood, and trigger of such an uprising are impossible to assess. Israel’s impressive operational achievements in the 12-day war against Iran do not in themselves indicate its ability to promote political change in Iran. On the contrary, historical experience shows that regime change through foreign intervention brings highly questionable results at best. This can be demonstrated by the overall failure of regime change attempts by the United States and even Israel’s limited forays into the business of regime change during the First Lebanon War and its failed efforts to topple Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Given the uncertainty surrounding if and when such a change might occur, it cannot serve as a working assumption for strategic planning. Moreover, it is advisable to refrain from public declarations on the topic of regime change, as foreign interference may undermine the legitimacy of pro-change forces within Iran. Until such change materializes, measures can be taken to weaken the regime and curb its ability to pose a range of threats to Israel’s national security.
If Israel adopts a strategic decision to promote regime change in Iran, or at least to weaken the regime, it may consider various tools: military means, overt political pressure, soft power efforts, and covert operations. Each of these should be evaluated according to two main criteria: first, whether the action helps shift the balance of power between the regime and its domestic opponents in favor of the latter; and second, whether it advances Israel’s broader strategic objectives in its confrontation with Iran. Israel’s top priority should remain preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, a strategy aimed at achieving this goal (whether militarily or diplomatically) should be prioritized, even at the cost of delaying regime change. This dilemma may arise if distancing Iran from its nuclear aspirations can be achieved through a diplomatic channel. Although such an agreement would bring sanctions relief and potentially act as a lifeline for the regime by easing economic strain, this is a cost Israel should be willing to bear. The relief of sanctions while strengthening the regime in the short term may actually bring about its end in the long term. If economic sanctions sufficiently strengthen the middle class and expose the Iranian populace to the West, these changes may serve as an eventual catalyst for regime change.
It is also worth noting that the US approach, at least at present, reflects not only a willingness to leave the regime in place but also to significantly strengthen it, as long as Iran is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. If Iran is willing to make major concessions, including giving up on enrichment, the United States is willing to provide major sanctions relief and even the possibility of American investment in Iran. Therefore, a fundamental disagreement could arise between Israel and the United States regarding the desired goal and strategy toward Iran, should Israel decide to actively pursue regime change in Tehran. As such, it is advisable for Israel to closely coordinate its strategy in this arena with the United States. Such coordination could also help Israel secure at least partial international legitimacy for advancing its preferred courses of action against the regime in Tehran.
Even if a diplomatic settlement is reached on the Iranian nuclear issue, it remains both appropriate and necessary to sustain international political and economic pressure on Iran. This can be achieved by rallying the international community around other areas of concern, including its missile program, regional aggression, support for international terrorism, influence operations on social media, and ongoing human rights violations.
The assassination of Khamenei, which was raised as a possibility during the war, would not necessarily result in regime change, although it might shake the ruling elite. Unlike Hezbollah or Hamas, the Islamic Republic is based on an institutionalized, structured political system with many mechanisms of continuity. The “Assembly of Experts,” composed of 88 clerics responsible for appointing the supreme leader, would likely have little difficulty selecting a successor, who could prove to be more extreme or more capable than Khamenei. Moreover, the death of the leader might, at least in the short term, strengthen internal cohesion and complicate efforts to destabilize the regime through popular protest. The IRGC could exploit the assassination to deepen their control over state institutions and establish a military-security regime that would be no more moderate than the existing one. Assassinating a senior cleric may also have inadvertent effects, such as elevating him into a martyr and thus glorifying the religious establishment. This could also create a symbolic narrative among global Shiite communities, portraying the conflict with Israel as part of a broader historical struggle, similar in meaning to the events of Karbala. Given Khamenei’s advanced age and growing reports about his declining health, the succession process is already underway. The possibility of his assassination, which was raised during the war, may have accelerated the vetting process of his potential successors.
Building a coalition that can pose a credible challenge to regime stability is a complex task. Such a coalition would need to be made up of broad and diverse swaths of Iranian society, including those focused on economic improvement, such as workers and pensioners, as well as students who have long been at the forefront of the fight for civil liberties. It is therefore advisable to avoid ties, when possible, with Iranian opposition groups (including some monarchist circles in the diaspora) who are perceived by large segments of the Iranian public as tainted and having betrayed Iran in its time of need. Although aligning with pro-Western and pro-Israel diaspora groups that push for revolutionary change may seem natural, such associations may, in fact, undermine the credibility of internal opposition and ultimately obstruct the desired outcome. It is possible to express support for the protest movement in Iran (if it resumes), and it is important to build capabilities that could be employed in the event of renewed mass mobilization. These could include tools for bypassing internet censorship, a strike fund financed from abroad to help citizens and workers sustain themselves during protests and strikes, and the development of capabilities to disrupt or undermine the regime’s repression mechanisms on a “day of reckoning.” At the same time, it is advisable to promote diplomatic, economic, perception-shaping, intelligence, and other measures, including assistance to various social sectors in Iran and to civil society institutions. These steps may help lay the groundwork for regime change in preparation for a mass protest movement.
Caution must be exercised regarding calls for the partitioning of Iran or the encouragement of separatist trends. The ethnic-linguistic issue in Iran has been a source of sensitivity for years, as nearly 50% of Iran’s population is comprised of ethnic-linguistic minorities, and it has occasionally fueled protest and even violent clashes in regions with minorities. However, most of these groups seek to preserve their cultural identities and to end discrimination, rather than to secede from Iran.
Unlike many Arab nation-states in the region, whose borders were drawn by Western powers following World War I, Iran has maintained a distinct political and cultural identity for centuries, despite profound ethnic and sectarian differences. The historical development of Iran’s ethnic minorities, their religious affiliations (Sunni and Shiite), and their varying degrees of integration into Iranian society significantly diminish the threat they pose to Iran’s national cohesion. The regime’s persistent fear of separatism has heightened public sensitivity to any perceived foreign attempts to promote ethnic fragmentation. Such efforts would likely backfire by uniting large segments of the Iranian public against Israel, which would be viewed as trying to fracture the country.
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[2] This paper is based on the collaborative work of Dr. Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, Dr. Thamar Eilam Gindin, Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur, Hannah Liberman-Alemu, Prof. Meir Litvak, Danny Citrinowicz, and Shahar Eilam.
Summary: (by: ChatGTP)
Israel’s 12-day war with Iran aimed primarily to degrade Iran’s nuclear and missile programs—not to explicitly pursue regime change—but several Israeli moves tried to spark renewed popular protests. Those efforts did not weaken the regime; in the short term they likely backfired, triggering “rally-around-the-flag” nationalism, pausing domestic protests, and tightening repression. Regime change remains possible but is ultimately outside Israel’s control and depends on Iranian society, not foreign action.
What happened & immediate effects
Intent vs. outcome: Israel’s declared goal was delaying Iran’s nuclear/missile progress. Some strikes (especially in week two) clearly sought to shake regime foundations if protests reignited; the ceasefire halted further escalation.
Backfire examples: The strike on Evin Prison killed civilians and drew condemnation from regime critics (incl. Narges Mohammadi), undercutting any mobilizing effect. Attacks on Basij/ISF sites didn’t spark uprisings or meaningfully degrade repression capacity.
Short-term dynamics: Nationalist “rally-around-the-flag” sentiment surged (more for the nation than the Islamic Republic), routine protests ebbed, and the state intensified arrests/executions under heightened paranoia. The opening Israeli strike exposed regime vulnerabilities, but cohesion rebounded for now.
Iran’s strategic bind
Rebuild nukes/missiles (risking arms race and diverting resources from a strained economy and failing infrastructure) vs. pursue negotiations/sanctions relief (which could stabilize the economy but challenge hardline priorities). Either path could reshape internal politics and revive public grievances later.
Four domestic scenarios to watch
Status quo to succession: System muddles through until Khamenei’s death; successor could be hardline or more pragmatic, with gradual institutional decay possible.
Popular uprising: Not imminent; would require cracks in IRGC/Basij loyalty and a tipping point in youth-led social shifts.
Military-security takeover (IRGC-led): More authoritarian/hawkish, not necessarily favorable to Israel; internal factionalism possible.
De facto leadership shift: Figurehead Supreme Leader while real power moves to IRGC/political collective, complicating external reads on decision-making.
Policy implications for Israel
Prioritize the nuclear file (military or diplomatic) even if a deal temporarily strengthens the regime; sanctions relief might, over time, empower a middle class conducive to change.
Avoid own-goals: Refrain from assassinating Khamenei, overt ties to widely disliked exile groups, and stoking separatism—all risk unifying the public behind the state.
If aiming to “shape the field” for future protests: Invest in non-kinetic support—censorship-bypass tools, strike funds, and capabilities that blunt repression—while maintaining international political/economic pressure on missiles, proxies, influence ops, and human-rights abuses.
Temper expectations: Foreign-driven regime change often fails; change, if it comes, will be Iranian-led. Keep U.S. coordination tight, anticipating potential divergence if Washington prioritizes a nuclear settlement over destabilization.
Bottom line: The war dealt the regime a shock but, so far, strengthened short-term cohesion and nationalism. Over the medium term, economic strain, succession uncertainty, and policy choices on nukes/proxies will determine whether today’s unity dissolves back into renewed dissent.