How a country's leaders become a victim of its own propaganda
The Reports are Secret to Hide the Fact Our Systems don't Work
Ted Postol is a professor at MIT and an expert on missile systems. He describes how government secrecy can lead to top-level leaders being unaware that the missile systems they fund don’t work. This leads to government leaders making war decisions while being ignorant of the fact that the anti-missile systems don’t work.. This happened in the Gulf War when Iraq fired approximately 40 Scud missiles at Israel. At the time the US reported nearly flawless success in intercepting the Scuds. The actual success rate is heavily debated, but we can only be confident in 4 interceptions.
Postol says that you become a victim of your own propaganda..
When you have the effect of misinforming all these people occupying government positions
The technical reports about these missiles are classified so failure is hidden
They showed me this report on the “Patriot” and it was slick. .. it was complete nonsense.
.. it’s been in the interest certainly of the Israelis and the Americans to confuse people as much as possible because none of these systems are working well against the particular targets they were designed to deal with. And so what you want to do is you don’t want to tell people we spent uh $50 billion dollars on this weapon system and it doesn’t work. You know, it’s a it’s a little bit of an embarrassment
QUESTIONS:
Had you heard that, contrary to US reports, in the 1991 Gulf War, the US was actually not able to shoot down Iraqi Scud missiles. Though initially fooled, later in the war the government thought it was important to pretend that it did so as to give Israel political cover to say out of the fighting?
How many Americans hear about the corrections to the war propaganda, even years later?
Who has an interest in hearing about and publicizing when systems do not work properly? How do their interests match up to those with an interest in exposing the problems?
TRANSCRIPT:
15:46
So my guess is somebody woke up and said,
15:52
“Let’s stop wasting these interceptors and move them to a location where they
15:58
can be useful, where there are lots of drone attacks chipping away at these
16:03
military bases in the Gulf.” And uh so that’s what my guess is what
16:10
happened here. So um so the people are you know it’s very confusing
16:17
the it’s how these interceptors work and what they’re capable of engaging
16:24
and um and it’s been in the interest certainly of the Israelis and the
16:30
Americans to confuse people as much as possible because none of these systems
16:35
are working well against the particular targets they were designed to deal with.
16:41
And so what you want to do is you don’t want to tell people we spent uh $50
16:47
billion dollars on this weapon system and it doesn’t work. You know, it’s a it’s a little bit of an embarrassment to
16:54
say the least. So you keep lying about it. And the more you lie about it, the
17:00
more you become the victim of your own propaganda because um when you’re you know there
17:08
only a few people who have the technical knowledge and expertise to understand what’s actually happening.
17:16
So when you lie like this, you also have the effect of misinforming all these
17:23
people in the US government and probably in the Israeli government as well about
17:29
how well this system is performing because as I’ve
17:35
mentioned multiple times, the people in these supposedly privileged
17:41
leadership positions don’t necessarily know more than the person on the
17:46
you know, they’re getting a lot of their information verbally. They don’t they don’t read or necessarily have access or
17:54
inclination to read technical reports. The technical reports about these
17:59
missiles are quite commonly uh classified
18:04
and and and held tightly because they would reveal that the systems are not functioning.
18:11
when I was uh uh when I was um
18:16
when I was involved and I revealed that the Patriot uh failed to function in the Gulf War of
18:22
1991, I still had active clearances at that time, you know, for classified
18:29
information. And when I went to the Congress, they showed me this report on Patriot and it was slick
18:36
and it was, you know, 90% performance. I
18:42
mean, you just couldn’t, you know, you wouldn’t believe it if you saw it. And a very, very slick glossy paper, very
18:50
nice, expensive printing color and all this. And it was complete
18:56
nonsense. Was complete nonsense. And this is the kind of thing they’re circulating for leadership.
19:04
So, uh, you know, uh, uh, President Bush, HW Bush, it’s the Gulf
19:13
War of 1991. He did not know that Patriot was failing
19:18
in the Gulf War of 1991 until late in the war.
19:24
Neither did Dick Cheney, his then Secretary of Defense.
19:31
They were told by the Israeli Minister of Defense in a meeting, I think it was
19:36
in January of the so the war was almost over, you know, was toward the end of the war
19:43
and they they they literally did not know. So you see, so the idea that people in these leadership positions are
19:49
well informed is uh is is not necessarily true. And
19:55
that’s what makes things so problematic. That’s why I have spent such an inordinate amount
20:03
of time warning people about Iran’s nuclear capability.
20:09
Not because I think the I don’t think the Iranians are in any way inclined to use nuclear
20:15
weapons against Israel first. I think they would if they were attacked by
20:21
Israel with nuclear weapons. And so the emphasis I have been constantly placing
20:27
on Iran’s program is not to say, “Oh, these these guys are really dangerous.”
20:34
It’s to say, don’t assume they can’t eliminate you as a state, Mr. Israeli,
20:40
if you think you can attack them with impunity, with nuclear weapons, because they can respond and they will eliminate
20:48
you as a survivable state. So, don’t do it. That’s I’m more worried
20:54
I’m worried about the Israelis, not the Iranians. The Iranians
20:59
have shown a tremendous uh levelheaded policy approach to nuclear weapons. They
21:08
they have um uh they have not built a nuclear weapon. They have not taken a
21:14
final step. And the reason there’s a multitude of reasons why they don’t want
21:21
to take steps toward a final nuclear capability.
21:27
they have Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt,
21:32
maybe the UAE even for you know these states uh would immediately try to get
21:40
nuclear weapons in the case of certainly Turkey uh I mean Saudi Arabia they could
21:46
get them very fast from Pakistan so um so the Iranians understand that
21:56
it’s not in their security interests to have all these nuclear armed states around them. So they don’t want to
22:02
provoke them. They’re very clear on this. They’ve been very clear on this. This is well thought out. They they get
22:08
high marks for understanding what their options are. So they want to negotiate a
22:17
sensible I want to ask sensible approach to dealing with the enrichment
22:24
capabilities that they’re developing. They will not give it up. Absolutely will not give it up because
22:31
they are they are in conflict with two nations
22:38
that have made it clear that their objective toward Iran is genocide.
22:46
That’s Israel and that’s the United States. You have a president of the United States saying, “I’ll wipe them
22:52
out completely. ends uh you know a multi,000-year civilization. You know,
22:59
now he can’t do it unless he wants to use an incredible number of nuclear
23:05
weapons, but um uh this kind of rhetoric will get your
23:12
under undivided attention. It would get mine. And um so then you tell the you
23:21
you tell the Iranians, well we want you to give up enrichment. That is
23:27
let me translate that. The the only thing that’s keeping Israel from attacking me with nuclear weapons
23:35
[laughter] because because I could strike back. We want you to give up ballistic missiles and and and drones.
23:43
Uh which is the only thing that keeps these these Americans and the Israelis
23:49
under control because otherwise their navy would be sailing right into the Persian Gulf and bombarding me. And uh
23:57
and believe us even though we attacked you while we were in negotiations with
24:02
you twice. And by the way, the situation where we
24:10
we we don’t accept your government, but uh but we created your government. We we
24:16
started in 1953 with Mosedc. We uh we then put in a terrible
24:22
repressive dictator. And then in 1979, another repressive
24:28
government replaced the repressive dictator. We don’t like that government, but we like the other one.
24:34
That was okay. uh even though we were in fact even though we were giving them through the
24:40
uh uh through the uh uh peace through atomic energy uh silliness were making
24:49
believe that atomic energy has no connection to atomic weapons. Um we were
24:55
helping the shah build a nuclear program when it was clear his intent his intent
25:01
was to eventually have nuclear weapons. So all of this mess
25:06
has been made mostly by the United States.
25:11
And if you sit there as a well-educated Iranian, and there are a lot of them, you say to
25:18
yourself, how do I deal with these crazies? They have no sense of history.
25:24
They have no morality. They somehow think that you know you
25:29
know all Muslims are like crazy lunatics like you know Osama bin Laden’s you know
25:35
you know they can’t tell the difference between one person and another you know uh
25:41
how do I negotiate with these people and the answer is
25:46
it’s very difficult and you’re going to need some real guarantees if you’re going to reach an agreement and that’s
25:52
what’s going on now from the Iranian side and from the western side is you
25:59
have uh these maniacs in Israel
26:04
who who are destroying Israel. I mean, if you were a supporter of Israel’s
26:11
future, let’s not say Zionist because maybe maybe you could be an enlightened
26:16
Israeli and say we we we owe the Palestinians the right to be here too.
26:22
you know, you could be enlightened and you wanted Israel to survive as a state, even not being a Zionist. You would look
26:28
at these uh current Israeli government and you say they’re destroying our
26:34
future. The um the Israeli government is now uh
26:40
persona nongrata with most American uh people who follow politics.
26:46
That includes most American Jews. You know, they look at this government. They’re murdering people at a fantastic
26:53
rate. They’re engaged in genocide, not only in Gaza, in southern Lebanon.
26:59
They’re crazy. They want to kill off everybody and then take it over for it’s
27:05
like, you know, 5,000 years ago, you you salt the land after you defeat your
27:11
enemy. So, you have this in Israel. Then you have the United States is completely out of control.
27:18
and um what do you do from the point of view of
27:23
of an Iranian? You can’t trust anything the Americans tell you. So, [snorts] it’s a very
27:29
difficult situation. I uh I I’m very sympathetic toward the
27:35
Iranian uh leadership’s dilemma with regard to dealing with diplomacy
27:41
because diplomacy is the only realistic solution and the behavior of the United States
27:49
and Israelis have thrown doubt on whether diplomacy
27:54
with these two absolute lunatic states has any meaning. So, it’s a difficult
28:01
situation, but as I’ll try to point out later, um
28:09
diplomacy is the only way of doing things. You have no choice.
28:15
The uh the bottom line is um uh what I [laughter] I’m losing I’m
28:24
losing time, so I it’s all right, but I can give the summary here. The bottom
28:29
line is um um in in 2025
28:38
uh basically before the Americans uh the June uh 2025 attack on uh on
28:48
Iran, the Iranians were producing 400 over 400
28:55
centrifuges per month. We know that because it was under monitoring from uh the International
29:02
Atomic Energy Agency. That’s a lot of centrifuges
29:07
and um we don’t know what amount of that manufacturing
29:14
capacity is underground in tunnels. Now,
29:20
presumably parts of it were destroyed in this massive attack that occurred, but that
29:26
doesn’t mean it was all destroyed. And given the situation and the Iranians
29:33
uh the Iranian sensitivity to the uh extreme uh
29:42
um uh aggressiveness of the United States and Israel,
29:48
uh it’s very hard for me to believe. I don’t know, but it’s very hard for me to if I I just, you know, I just put myself
29:56
in the Iranians position. Incidentally, if you’re ever really doing serious policy work, that’s the
30:03
only way to understand the other side so that you can negotiate with them
30:09
sensibly. And I sit there and I say, I’m advising the Ayatollah, any Ayatollah,
30:15
not just the last one. Um, and I’m a technical person and the ITL
30:22
asks me, uh, what should we do? Well, I’d say, well, we we should certainly
30:27
move some of our manufacturing facilities to locations where the Americans can’t
30:33
get it. These are these tunnels, which are very essentially impossible for
30:39
practical purposes to destroy. And uh we don’t have to have it all there, but we should make sure that we
30:46
have what we need to continue enrichment should we need
30:51
to. It’s just prudent. It’s not, you know, and it’s very hard for me to believe that the Iranians haven’t done
30:58
this. I’m I’m not trying to uh ascribe immoral behavior to them.
31:06
This is an existential threat they’re facing. Why would you do otherwise when you’re
31:11
facing adversaries who literally want to destroy your civilization?
31:18
You know, you you you have no choice but to do prudent things like this.
31:24
So for example, I think it’s plausible I again I don’t know it’s plausible to assume that the
31:33
um Iranians uh can produce a 100 or even 200
31:39
centrifuges per month even now and that they may have a significant
31:46
number of centrifuges already in place in tunnels somewhere
31:52
whether they’re all set up in centrifuges. Maybe they are, maybe they’re not. We
31:57
don’t know. But to assume that they have no capability is really uh the ultimate
32:05
in stupidity. It’s the ultimate in stupidity. Let me uh why don’t we take a look at
32:11
slide number six because I want to make a few points. Yeah, we won’t have a chance to go through a
32:17
lot of it, but
32:25
This is this shows you the curve of the critical mass
32:32
uh versus percentage of enrichment. So if you look at the uh the x axis on
32:41
let’s look at the left curve. If you look at the x-axis on the lex
32:46
curve, you see it goes from zero to 100%. And you see a red line at roughly 90%.
32:55
And you see a curve uh at the um at the bottom um
33:05
you see a red line. You you see red line starting at the 90% and going upward and
33:12
intersecting a curve at about 14 kilograms.
33:18
That is about that’s the critical mass you need to build a nuclear weapon if
33:24
you surround the weapon with what’s called a reflector. I’ll describe what I mean by that shortly.
33:31
When people say the Iranians can build 10 or 11 nuclear weapons by quickly
33:39
enriching the 60% enriched uranium uranium hexaflloride they have they are
33:46
talking about 25 kilogram critical masses.
33:51
So that’s the last if you look uh you can I think you should be able to read
33:57
it. You see a red line at the top of of the group of solid lines below. That’s
34:04
the 25 kilogram point. So you can see that if you design a
34:12
weapon with either a uranium and I’ll I’ll describe what I mean by that or
34:17
burillium reflector, you could need much less uranium
34:24
to build a nuclear weapon. So uh
34:30
let’s take a look at slide 10. This is a notional This is a a notional
34:38
discussion. Slide 10. You got it. There you go. This
34:43
is a notional diagram of a nuclear weapon called gun assembled
34:49
nuclear weapon where um this looks nothing like the bomb that was designed
34:57
and dropped on Hiroshima. This is a more modern design.
35:03
It’s uh you have a a sphere of of enriched uranium
35:10
with a significant uh um hole in it.
35:17
And in that hole, uh, you could have more uranium 235,
35:24
which you would shove in using explosives to drive
35:29
plugs of U235 into the center, resulting in a sphere of a certain critical mass.
35:37
All right. So um so this is a reasonable design for a um
35:46
uh you know uh a second second generation. By second generation I mean
35:51
unsophisticated uh atomic bomb using uranium 235.
35:58
Uh it’s uh easily implemented.
36:03
You don’t need to test this as a nuclear test because the only thing you need to
36:10
test is the assembly mechanism which you can do with depleted uranium. Make sure
36:16
it all works as you expect it to. And then all you do is substitute
36:23
uh enriched uranium, the weapons grade uranium for the depleted uranium and the
36:28
system will certainly work. So this is a weapon you don’t need to test. Let’s look at slide 11.
36:35
Let’s put some numbers on this. Well,
36:41
if we look to the left, the leftmost uh
36:46
the grided the circles, the spheres that are gr red uh uh
36:54
grided circles show you rough diameter of a critical mass
37:01
of uh uranium to get a nuclear detonation. if you have nothing
37:07
surrounding it. In other words, it the the neutrons leak out and you just need
37:12
more and more uranium to make up for the new. So you need 55 kilograms
37:19
to um um to um build a nuclear weapon uh
37:30
with 20 kilograms of um of uranium of enriched uranium.
37:38
You would have to surround it with about 10 cm. So you see the diameter is maybe
37:47
25 cm but there’s 10 cm on either side of uranium 238.
37:54
Uranium 238 mainly performs the function
37:59
of um reflecting neutrons back in. It also performs the function of putting a
38:07
very large mass around the enriched uranium core which
38:14
means that when the core goes nuclear and starts pushing outward the mass will
38:20
delay the rapid expansion outward and thereby lead to a higher yield nuclear
38:27
weapon. So now the weight of the uranium reflector is large.
38:33
So if I take the reflector and and the and the core together, the whole thing
38:40
weighs 350 kg. But if everything else I need weighs
38:46
another 150 kg, this whole thing can weigh 500 kg.
38:52
So, uh, that that’s enough to, um, be
38:57
carried by any of the standard long range missiles that Iran is now using to
39:04
attack Israel. So, when you uh look at the most recent
39:09
edition of the U Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, another one of my favorite
39:15
uh inaccurate information societies, um you’ll you’ll see this little video
39:22
they put out and at the end of it, a guy named Steve Federer,
39:27
uh who should know better because he’s actually technical technically trained and he’s uh was in the science advisor
39:35
advisor’s office. He’s there telling people wrongly wrongly
39:41
that uh an Iranian nuclear weapon would be much too big and cumbersome and heavy to fly on on an Iranian ballistic
39:48
missile bulocks. That’s not true. And uh
39:54
if maybe the Bulletin wants to come out with a design analysis that shows why this is wrong, I’d be really interested.
40:01
But I don’t think they have the technical capabilities in the organization. even though they claim to be experts. So this is a real problem.
40:09
Now why is it a real problem? Why am I always so uh you know focused on these
40:14
organizations? Because they misinform people and and it’s important to understand
40:23
that the Iranians are not far away from this capability if they choose to do it.
40:31
Because if you think they are far away from it, then you will have a policy
40:37
that does not assume that you have a critical need to negotiate with them. So
40:43
this is not just Ted Postal having a vendetta against the bulletin, which incidentally I do. I don’t I don’t like
40:49
this organization. I it’s a group of people who misrepresent themselves as
40:54
experts and uh and and they don’t do their homework. They could do their homework, but they don’t. So, it’s
41:01
inexcusable, but they’re driving policy decisions because lots of people assume
41:07
they know what they’re talking about. After all, they say they’re experts. So, the Albert Einsteins and Openheimers are
41:14
no longer part of the bulletin. The bulletin has degenerated into a social club and there not many technical people
41:21
there. And the technical people there have limited knowledge and they’re lazy. So, that’s important. That’s why I keep
41:29
going back to this. You need accurate information in order to formulate policies that make sense. And if you
41:36
have accurate information on this particular issue, you will know that it’s absolutely imperative to quickly
41:44
make it possible for the Iranians to negotiate with you. It’s not
41:50
it’s not the Iranians. They’re happy to negotiate, as I’ve tried to explain. They have every reason to negotiate. But
41:57
if you’re so screwed up that you can’t even figure out how to, you know, put them in a position where they think they
42:03
can negotiate with you, then you got a real problem. Now, on the right side,
42:09
there’s the 14.1 kilogram core. And uh so that’s um uh that’s um uh also
42:20
surrounded by 10 cm of in this case burillium. Burillium is
42:26
an extremely lightweight material and it operates as a um as a neutron reflector.
42:36
So the advantage of it is the weapon you would build would have an overall weight the
42:42
components would would have an overall weight of 40 or 50 kilograms rather than 350.
42:49
Uh but uh this would probably give you a somewhat lower yield explosion
42:56
because the tamper the the reflector also operates as a massive shield that
43:04
prevents the the the uninhibited uh expansion of the core when it goes
43:11
nuclear. And this is a very light core. So it doesn’t have the mass that the
43:16
uranium reflector has. So again if I were the technical advisor to you uh to
43:22
uh Ayatollah Nema uh I would u I would
43:28
advise you I’d say well well uh you know we have the we have the
43:34
capacity to carry 500 600 700 kilograms
43:39
on a long range missile. So that’s not an issue. The weapon size will not be
43:44
very different. Its weight will be different. Let’s use the uranium reflected core. First of all, it’s
43:51
easier to work with than burillium. And also um uh we’ll probably get a higher
43:57
yield weapon because see these weapons are these weapons can yield between five
44:03
and 15 kilotons without implosion. Implosion gives you
44:09
more density in the uranium, but it’s a complicated scheme and an implosion
44:15
mechanism is much we have to test that. We we we can’t just use it against the
44:21
Israelis without testing. So if we want a simple device that we just have
44:26
without ever testing, but have it, the the the uranium reflected weapon is
44:32
fine. It will do the job for us. So, my guess is we’re looking at uranium uh
44:39
uranium reflected weapons. That’s, you know, that that’s what the um the um
44:48
uh the Iranians are have in the background.
44:54
So, I’m not saying they they’re doing it yet, but All right. So, what does all this mean? [clears throat]
45:01
Let’s go to slide 23. See, I’m skipping over an enormous
45:07
amount. Um, we have this um, let’s go to slide 21
45:14
very quickly. This shows you what I had described
45:20
earlier that as you each uh, amount of work I do removes a fixed amount of
45:30
uranium 238. it. You can think of it as separated
45:35
work units in this case. And so when we get to the right side and we have 50%
45:42
enriched uh uranium hexaflloride
45:48
to enrich to 100% takes much less effort than to enrich to 50% because the enrich
45:55
to 50% took eight steps, seven or eight steps. um
46:02
whereas one step gets me to 100% from the 50%. So, so we have this accelerating capability.
46:09
So, when we have 60% enriched uranium hex hexafflloride, let’s go to
46:15
slide 23. Now, we would need 5,500
46:23
uh kilograms separated work units per year to get 25 kg
46:29
of 90% enriched uranium. But if we have um um
46:39
a small maybe 38 kg of 60% enriched uh uranium hexafflloride
46:46
I um I can get 25 kg of enriched uh 90% enriched uranium
46:55
uh with with about 120 separative work units and given a
47:02
cascade of maybe 300 350 centrifuges which the Iranians have
47:08
demonstrated. We know that they can do this. The I IAEA reported this. It’s one
47:14
and a half weeks of work. you know, if if it’s all set up to get that enrichment, that’s that gives us uh and
47:24
since they’re 44, if you look at the next step down, they’re 440 kg of uh 60% enriched uranium and we need
47:32
38 kg to have 25 kg for a bomb means we
47:37
have roughly 11 bombs worth of um of
47:43
uranium uh in the 60% enriched uranium. However,
47:50
what if we only need 14.1 kg
47:56
of enriched uranium? Because we’re building bombs with 10 cm
48:02
depleted uranium reflectors like I just described. Technology for doing that is no harder.
48:10
not harder at all to fabricate such a bomb relative to
48:16
um you know the 25 kilogram bomb. It’s a heavier bomb, but we know we can carry
48:23
it on a ballistic missile. So if if we only need uh 68 uh uh we
48:33
only need 68 separative work units uh to to take the u a smaller amount uh
48:42
21 we have 21 kilograms now 60% enriched uranium
48:47
21 kilograms gives us 14 kilograms of 90% enriched uranium then we have um we
48:55
only need 68 swoo separated work units. We That’s about five or six days to get
49:03
the 14.1 kg of 90% enriched uranium for a bomb.
49:09
Notice also that since we only need um um uh
49:17
actually this number here is wrong. Uh the number below there is 14.1 in the
49:25
second in the last equation on the bottom. That’s wrong. I put it together this morning. Um that should be 440 kg
49:33
over 21 kg. So we’re really talking about 20 20 or
49:40
22 or 23 bombs that I can build with the currently available 60% uranium. So the
49:48
the current wisdom is these guys could build 10 bombs,
49:53
but in fact that’s not correct. They can build 20 bombs if they’re willing to
50:00
have a heavier bomb. And and the 20 uh the 10 bomb number comes from a number
50:07
that was bureaucratically arrived at when people were talking about uranium
50:12
enrichment. You know, they were trying to set standards for the non-prololiferation
50:19
treaty. And after a lot of uh hemming and hawing and bureaucratic infighting,
50:25
they arrived at a standard that 25 kilograms of highlyenriched uranium would constitute a potential bomb. But
50:33
in fact, it’s 14 or 15 kg. And um if you were Steve Federer, you
50:39
should know that and you should understand that the bomb you would design would also be able to be carried
50:47
by a um um you know a a ballistic
50:52
missile that already exists and is operating. So, does this mean
50:58
we we the Americans and the Israelis must redouble and redouble again our efforts
51:05
to destroy Iran? No. What it means is we have to do
51:12
everything we can. It’s in our interest to do what the Iranians also want to do.
51:19
give them a negotiated position that allows them to guarantee their security
51:25
while at the same time uh gives us uh confidence that they’re not an active
51:33
nuclear weapons state. They’re they may be a potential nuclear weapons state, but they’re not active. They know what’s
51:39
in their best interest. They’re not going to go further unless we give them the reason to go further. So this is an
51:46
argument not for going after the Iranians more aggressively. This is an argument
51:53
for being very serious about negotiating. And uh I can’t understand
52:01
why so many people are trying to downplay this threat. I’m not trying to
52:08
overstate it. I’m I’m talking the technical reality. somebody can show if
52:14
Steve Federer wants to put invite him on. Let him explain why I’m wrong. Have
52:20
the bulletin on. Let them let them do it. Let’s let’s hear their argument. But
52:25
um by lulling people into the sense that there’s no problem here is is crazy
52:33
because it not only shows a lack of understanding of the technical realities, it shows a lack of
52:39
understanding and respect for the politics of Iran.
52:45
Because these people are not crazy. They’re not a bunch of crazy uh Osama bin Laden’s. They’re a bunch of very
52:52
deeply thinking, well-informed, highly educated people who know what’s in their
52:58
security interest and they understand that not having a nuclear weapon is in their interest. So give them a chance,
53:05
negotiate with them. Anyway, so that’s that’s the point of this number. But we’re talking about many more nuclear
53:12
weapons, all of them deliverable by ballistic missiles in a short period of time.
53:18
I’m not talking about if you want to uh produce,
53:23
you know, if this situation were to persist, let’s say it persists for four or five years,
53:30
which could well happen, and the Iranians choose to uh enrich um
53:38
natural uranium, they could produce a bomb per year from natural uranium in
53:44
addition to the stuff the the 20 nuclear weapons they can produce from the 60%
53:51
enriched uranium in wheats. So these this country has a lot of firepower, a
53:59
lot of firepower and they don’t want to use it.
54:04
So work out a deal. You know, they’re happy to be inspected
54:10
as long as it’s reasonable and you’re not trying to destroy their ability to defend themselves.
54:17
If if you want to take an Israeli statement, the Israelis like to say we
54:23
have the right to defend ourselves. Well, so do the Iranians. You know, this idea that they they have
54:28
the the Israelis have the right to defend themselves by killing and massacring all the people around them
54:34
while all the Iranians want us to be left alone in order to defend themselves. I mean,
54:42
it’s so ridiculous. It’s hard to believe. And this is because of the incredible uh uh
54:50
shortsightedness of western people and and also the
54:56
complete lack of serious discussion from the community that sees itself as
55:03
the arms control community. the community that sees itself as the community that is um um negotiating
55:14
a a more a safer world. So why isn’t the bulletin
55:20
of the atomic scientists producing analysis like this and saying look these
55:27
politically these guys want to negotiate here’s here’s the evidence we have lots of evidence that they want to they they
55:34
went into this agreement the JCPOA so we know they want to negotiate if we
55:39
listen to their analysis people who are involved in the negotiations
55:45
they give you the argument that I just gave my argument it’s an argument they came up. I I I came I mean I I would
55:52
like I said if I looked at the situation the way Muhammad Zarif looked at it you
55:57
know yeah sure um uh I come up with the
56:02
same answer because the constraints are the same and if you’re using logic you come up with the same solution. So
56:11
there’s no argument here from the Iranian point of view that they want to negotiate.
56:16
But the West is not making it possible. So why isn’t the bulletin explaining to people why the incentive should be
56:25
emphasized to negotiate? Instead, they’re putting out nonsense about the Iranians can’t do this. After
56:31
all, we know that, you know, they they I don’t mean to be insulting. They ride
56:37
on cabbles, you know. [laughter] It’s just it’s just so pathetic. It
56:42
really is pathetic. And there is an underlying racism here. There is an underlying I have argued this for many
56:50
years. It’s like um uh you know uh there was a debate in the United States around
56:55
the 2000 2010. It was so was so ridiculous that it’s
57:04
shameful, but I should bring it up because it show it exposes ignorance and
57:09
racism. There was a a debate uh about deterrence, you know, deterrence.
57:17
Could other could would other countries um uh rational enough to be deterred
57:26
like we would be? I mean, you I mean, if you go on a farm and go near a cow
57:33
that’s just had calves, you would understand deterrence.
57:38
A female cow who’s just had calves will will deter you from going near her
57:45
calves. I mean, what are you talking about? I mean, the underlying racism in
57:52
that argument is extraordinary. And this was a conversation
57:58
that was going on at the top of American uh government and people with straight
58:04
faces were making it and nobody said do you understand that that’s racist,
58:09
[laughter] you know, it’s hard to believe. And and
58:17
this is the kind of uh narrowness of intellect that we see in the uh certainly in the
58:25
American mind. The Israeli mind is distorted in a different way but
58:31
distorted no doubt. And uh and unless you recognize
58:37
the you the rationality and humanity of your potential adversary,
58:43
you’re you’re always going to do the wrong thing.
58:48
Because if you’re dealing with someone irrational, there’s no way to stop them if they have
58:55
the resources. And the Iranians have the resources. But the irrational players in this case
59:00
are the Israelis. I don’t know what these guys are capable of. I just don’t know what they’re
59:07
capable of. I mean, I have friends in Israel. I, you know, I know I I wouldn’t
59:12
say I know Israel Israel well now because I can’t imagine the Israel I knew from 10 or 20 years ago. I can’t
59:21
and I know the soldiers. I know many of these people. I these people would never
59:27
never shoot a child, you know. uh as a sniper never. This is
59:34
routinely going on there. Something has changed in a horrifying way and the society has descended into some kind of
59:42
horrifying uh semi well not semi-fascist state and this is really problematic.
59:50
So anyway so I didn’t get a chance to talk about
59:55
centrifuges my all my work we’re gonna continue these talks that
1:00:01
and let’s but but the point I want to make here is that we are talking about a country that
1:00:08
has extraordinarily sophisticated technical capabilities
1:00:15
and extraordinary rationality in its policymaking.
1:00:21
And you know when you go to war it’s a terrible thing. You destroy things. But
1:00:27
they have fought this war with unbelievable skill. They have shown that
1:00:32
they know what they’re doing in the way they fought the war. They they’ve really effectively defeated.
1:00:38
And if the war starts again, which I think it will, I hope I’m wrong. uh
1:00:43
they’re going to put Israel and the United States both in
1:00:48
a much worse military situation. The game is over from the point of view of
1:00:54
the military the weight of of the military defeat. It’s going to get
1:00:59
worse, not better, uh for United States and and and Israel. And you know, we’re
1:01:06
going to have that the fleet, the American naval forces standing
1:01:13
off, you know, thousand kilometers or 600 kilometers off the straight of Hormuz
1:01:20
helpless. So, we can f bomb to some
1:01:25
extent u Iranian structures on on on on the
1:01:30
surface. We can’t do anything to their military. There was a report I just saw. I don’t know how accurate it is, but I
1:01:35
believe it. I think it’s that 75% of the launchers that the CIA
1:01:41
uh just issued a report that 75% of the launchers are still operating in Iran
1:01:49
almost. In fact, it sounds to me a little high. I mean, a little low, I’m
1:01:54
sorry, a little low because I don’t know where we could have destroy how we could have destroyed all these
1:02:00
launchers. I mean I you it’s so hard to find these things and you’re only over the country a short interval of time and
1:02:07
you know you just don’t have the capacity to do it. So uh so the CIA you know they
1:02:16
destroyed it all you know earlier and there’s nothing left now now there’s a
1:02:21
CIA report that leaks says 75% of the launches are still there. So you’re not
1:02:28
talking about a country We don’t have 75% of our strike capability anymore. We’ve used up all
1:02:35
our, you know, our cruise missiles. We’re, you know, uh,
1:02:41
all of our standoff missiles, almost all of our air defense missiles.
1:02:46
Who’s in a worse situation? It’s amazing.
1:02:51
And still having a reasonable approach to
1:02:56
diplomacy is not on the uh on the drawing board.
1:03:02
And and and the organizations that’s supposed to be
1:03:08
explaining to people [clears throat] why what a rational policy alternative would
1:03:14
be are out there saying, “Oh, don’t worry. They can’t build a bomb because it’ll be too big.
1:03:21
to fly on a missile. Don’t worry about those guys. You know, they can’t do it.
1:03:26
Well, they can do it and they don’t want to do it. That’s the other important
1:03:31
thing. They can do it and they don’t want to do it. So, give them a chance. Use diplomacy. That’s the point of this
1:03:38
discussion here now. Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. Thank you so much, Dad, for being with
1:03:44
us today. [laughter] Great pleasure as always. Well, call the bulletin and ask them why they’re not
1:03:50
arguing for that policy. Write them if you if you can get a if you can get an address for them. They’re all so hard to
1:03:57
reach. I took me a little while to get people’s email addresses. If you want, just write me a note. I’ll send them to
1:04:03
you. Yeah, I’ll send you the the CEO’s address. Uh, you know, she’s, as she said in my
1:04:10
discussion with her, she’s she’s very busy. So, she didn’t have a chance to read anything that I sent her. So, I’m
1:04:16
not busy, of course, but she’s busy. Important person. So, um, too busy to
1:04:23
know what you’re talking about. That’s what the bottom line was. Yeah. I’m here to tell you I’m an expert, give
1:04:31
you advice. And by the way, I I I just have no interest in understanding what
1:04:36
sound advice would be. So, I produced these nonsense like they
1:04:42
just produced in the most recent edition. Go look at the video. Yeah.
1:04:47
And complain. Okay.
1:04:53
Thank you, Dad. Thank you. Thank you. And we’ll be talking and see you soon. Yeah. Byebye.