Iran wants to wreck Trump's Presidency and establish itself as the 4th World Power.
The War will likely not end before November.
Iran wants to Wreck Trump’s Presidency and emerge from this War as the 4th World Power. They will not want to settle with Trump before the November elections.
5:57 because what’s happening is this this everybody wants this to be over. Well that’s because they are not Iran. Okay.
6:07 All right. That’s the and what Iran is now wants is they have uh they want to become that emerging power. Okay. So how
6:16 do you do that? You keep the straight of Hormuz and you make sure everybody knows you’re in control which is what they just did this morning with
6:22 demonstration. Number two, in about a year, you want nuclear weapons. You’re going to want nuclear weapons here. Uh and number three is you want to
6:32 go down in history as the country that torpedoed Trump’s presidency when the Democrats couldn’t. Just think about.
6:40 that on their legacy. You see, this would now establish them in this powerful way. And you’re going to if
6:47 that happens, if they torpedo Donald Trump’s presidency, oh my goodness, the cowtowing that’s going to come to them
6:54 from, you know, UAE because the governments in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, they’re going to start to be fearful.
7:01. Well, if you can torpedo Trump’s presidency, what are you going to do to me? So, this this is what the game we’re in is power politics of the first order.
DETAIL:
Six Questions That Actually Explain This War (Substack)
1. Is This About Trump—or Something Deeper?
The core issue was clear: a state with Iran’s size, geography, and regional position moving toward the nuclear threshold would be extraordinarily difficult to coerce or contain once it crossed that line. That problem has driven U.S. policy ever since.
By prioritizing pressure over sustained diplomatic constraint, his approach increased the likelihood that the nuclear issue would be resolved not through delay and monitoring, but through force.
2. What Is the Strongest Case for the Administration’s Strategy—and Where Does It Break Down?
The strongest version of the administration’s logic is straightforward: use limited force to degrade Iran’s capabilities, signal resolve, avoid large-scale ground war, and create leverage for a negotiated outcome.
The problem is the assumption embedded in that logic: that limited force can change incentives without triggering counter-escalation that expands the conflict. History provides little support for this. In Vietnam, incremental bombing expanded the target set without producing political concession. In Kosovo, a limited campaign stretched into a 78-day escalation. Limited strikes rarely remain limited. They create pressure for the next move.
Such strikes would not eliminate Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping. Instead, they would shift the conflict toward humanitarian impact, increase the legitimacy of Iranian retaliation, and expand the target set to U.S. partners across the Gulf. That, in turn, would deepen global attribution of responsibility to Washington for escalation
The result is not coercive success, but a faster movement into the same escalation trap under worse conditions.
3. Why Is Iran’s Power Changing Now—If It Always Had This Capability?
Iran’s capability is not new. The context is.
For two decades, Iran has had the ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. But had it acted first—closing or seizing the Strait—the likely outcome would have resembled the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: rapid coalition formation, broad legitimacy for counterforce, and sustained pressure to reverse the move.
That is precisely why Iran did not act first. It waited for the US to become the “aggressor” and the world to blame the US for everything that followed.
4. If Anyone Can Disrupt Hormuz, How Can Iran “Control” It?
Iran does not need to close the Strait. It needs to demonstrate a credible, repeated ability to impose costs.
That is enough to shift insurance markets, alter shipping behavior, and force political accommodation.
Critically, Iran is uniquely positioned to exploit this. Other actors—the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE—could also disrupt shipping. But doing so would spike oil prices and accelerate damage to the global economy, including their own interests. Iran benefits from controlled instability. Selective disruption raises prices and leverage in ways that work to its advantage. That’s why US lifted sanctions on Iran’s (and Russia’s) oil.
Control emerges not from dominance—but from asymmetric incentives.
5. Is There Still an Off-Ramp?
There was.
On February 27, Iran offered a limited deal: retain low-level enrichment under a restored inspection regime similar to the 2015 agreement. The next day, the United States rejected that pathway and began large-scale strikes.
That decision changed the bargaining range.
Iran now retains its full spectrum of enriched uranium—placing it near the nuclear threshold. It can influence roughly a fifth of global oil flows. And it is deepening coordination with Russia and China.
This is not a state negotiating from vulnerability. It is negotiating from leverage.
6. What Should We Watch Next?
Watch logistics—not rhetoric.
Ground operations require preparation that cannot be hidden:
– heavy airlift (C-17, C-5 patterns)
– fuel, munitions, and sustainment units ..
If they align, the decision is being made—regardless of what leaders say publicly.
The Bottom Line
Initial strikes did not resolve the conflict. They expanded it. Iran responded by widening the battlefield. The United States now faces pressure to escalate further—or accept a shift in the balance of power.
This is the Escalation Trap.
It operates through structure, not personality.
And it leads to a narrowing choice:
escalate to restore control—or adapt to a new global reality.
Elsewhere:
Larry Johnson: The nuclear issue is an pretext. The Islamic Republic is the issue and at the root. The US can not accept that the Iranian people rose up and overthrew the Shah, a US-appointed tool of American colonial control.