How many wars were justified by lying and misleading the public?
1) World War I — Lusitania
What happened (May 7 1915). A German U-boat torpedoed the British liner RMS Lusitania, killing about 1,198 people, including 128 Americans. The disaster outraged U.S. opinion but the U.S. remained neutral. Encyclopedia Britannica
The Germans knew the Lusitania was carrying weapons and put ads in the New York newspapers, warning passengers not to take the ship. After the sinking, few Americans were told that the Lusitania’s was carrying 4,200 cases of rifle/machine-gun cartridges plus 1,250 cases of 3-inch shrapnel shells (shell bodies) and the fuze cases shipped separately, These arms weighed approximately 137 tons, and took up approximately 4,600 ft³ of space.
Comment: (Wei Wangsays) The sinking of Lusitania was absolutely legal, since it carried munitions for the British war effort in its hold. Hence, it should be regarded as a legitimate target. However, due to the British deceptions, it was not revealed to the public at the time. The torpedoes triggered the munitions explosions which subsequently doomed the ship. Otherwise, the ship would not have sunken, or could have stayed afloat a little longer, allowing all passengers and the crews to safely depart. Basically, it was a setup by the British to lure America into the War.
What Wilson told the country (April 2, 1917)
Germany had announced it would “put aside all restraints of law or of humanity” and wage unrestricted U-boat war; neutral ships and lives were no longer safe. University of Richmond Blogs
The U.S. must fight for freedom of the seas, the rights of neutral nations, and a peace based on “political liberty”—“The world must be made safe for democracy.
2) Vietnam (1964–73) — Gulf of Tonkin
A. Contemporaneous claim (trigger for escalation).
President Johnson told Americans on Aug. 4, 1964 that U.S. ships were attacked and that “retaliatory” strikes were under way. Miller Center
On Aug. 5 he told Congress the North Vietnamese “have deliberately and systematically attacked” U.S. vessels. Avalon Project
B. Later findings.
NSA’s declassified histories show the alleged Aug. 4 “second attack” did not occur; intercepts were misread and contrary evidence disregarded. National Security ArchiveNSA
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed Aug. 7, 1964, became the legal basis for broad war powers. National Archives
Verdict: The core casus belli for major escalation (the “second attack”) was false.
3) Dominican Republic (1965) — “Prevent a Communist takeover” / “Protect lives”
A. Contemporaneous claim.
Johnson announced Marines were landing “to protect American lives,” adding that the OAS would be involved. The American Presidency ProjectMiller Center
Privately, he pressed an explicitly anti-Communist framing (“really got to be anti-communist”). National Security Archive
B. Later findings.
Declassified tapes and scholarly reviews find the Communist threat was overstated in U.S. internal reporting and decision-making. National Security ArchiveSJSU ScholarWorksmavmatrix.uta.edu
Verdict: A real crisis existed, but the imminent “Communist takeover” rationale was significantly exaggerated.
4) Grenada (1983) — “Rescue U.S. students” / “Soviet-Cuban base”
A. Contemporaneous claim.
President Reagan said the invasion aimed to rescue Americans “in danger” and thwart a Soviet-Cuban stronghold. Reagan LibraryThe American Presidency Project
B. Later findings.
Critics (including contemporaneous press and later military/historical reviews) argued the danger to students was overstated and the scope of the operation went well beyond evacuation. The New YorkerCQ Press LibraryArmy University Press
Verdict: Key public-facing justifications were contested as overstated relative to the operation’s scale and aims.
5) Panama (1989) — “Protect Americans / defend democracy / drug war / treaties”
A. Contemporaneous claim.
President George H. W. Bush listed four objectives (safeguard U.S. lives; defend democracy; combat drug trafficking; protect canal treaties). American Rhetoric
B. Later findings.
The U.N. General Assembly deplored the invasion; a Security Council resolution condemning it was vetoed by the U.S., UK, and France—underscoring widespread international view of the legal pre-textual nature of the rationale. Los Angeles TimesUPISecurity Council Report
Verdict: The multi-point rationale was lawful to U.S. officials but widely judged pretextual/overbroad internationally.
6) Gulf War / Kuwait (1990–91) — “Incubator babies”
A. Contemporaneous claim.
The most-covered atrocity story came from a 15-year-old (“Nayirah”) who testified Iraqis removed babies from incubators; the video was pushed to U.S. media. C-SPAN
B. Later findings.
Human Rights Watch documented the public-relations role of Hill & Knowlton in promoting the allegation and noted the lack of credible evidence for “incubator killings.” Human Rights Watch+1
Amnesty International, which had repeated the claim early on, later acknowledged it lacked reliable evidence for babies being killed by removal from incubators. GovInfotheasa.net
Verdict: A marquee atrocity claim used to rally support was fabricated/unsupported.
7) Iraq (2003–11) — WMD & Terror Links
A. Contemporaneous claim.
Secretary Colin Powell at the U.N. (Feb. 5, 2003) asserted Iraq had mobile biolabs and other WMD-related activity; “These are facts.” State DepartmentNational Security ArchiveCNN Transcripts
Dick Cheney claimed that Osama bin Laden had ties to Saddam Hussein.**
B. Later findings.
The Iraq Survey Group (Duelfer Report, Sept. 2004) found no stockpiles and no reconstituted active programs at the time of invasion. GovInfoNational Security ArchiveCIA
Verdict: Central factual claims used to justify war (active WMD programs/stockpiles) were false.
8) Libya (2011) — “Avert imminent massacre in Benghazi”
A. Contemporaneous claim.
President Obama: coalition action “succeeded in averting a massacre,” and the mission aimed to protect civilians under UNSCR 1973. (See also his March 19 announcement of “limited military action.”) whitehouse.gov+1Justice Department
B. Later findings.
The UK Parliament’s cross-party Foreign Affairs Committee concluded the massacre claim was not supported by available evidence and that the threat was overstated. Parliament Publications+1
Petraeus admitted that, before his testimony, he had been told that the attack had its origins in terrorism, not the video he had described in his testimony
Verdict: The central threat narrative was contested after the fact as overstated (though some analysts maintain intervention still prevented a potential mass killing).
9) Syria - Poison gas / OCPW
Two experienced UN OPCW investigators say that they found that Syria did not use chlorine gas against civilians, but that their report was suppressed. They report that rather than chlorine, a nerve agent like sarin was used instead, which better corresponds with observations of foaming at the mouth.
The UN OPCW objects to these two former inspectors claims being heard on procedural grounds. [Background]
10) Israel (Oct 7) — WMR: Weaponized Mass Rape
A. Contemporaneous claim.
Beheaded Babies, Babies in Ovens, Baby ripped out of mother, Weaponized Mass Rape, Burned cars and Kibbutzes
B. Later findings.
No evidence to support, Family of NYTimes featured victim Gal Abdush denies she was raped, Kibbitz spokesperson denies Shirrobi sisters were raped. Video surfaces contradicting Shirobbi sister rape claim, Released hostabes report that they were treated well
Verdict:
11) Iran (Operation Midnight Hammer) 2025 — WMD: Nuclear bomb
A. Contemporaneous claim.
William Burns, Tulsi Gabbard, Israeli “Intelligence”
Desire for regime change: 7 countries in 5 years.
Netanyahu has been pushing this for decades.
Now he’s under legal threat
B. Later findings.
Verdict:
12) Iran (possible future) — WMD: Nuclear bomb
A. Contemporaneous claim.
Iran still has nuclear weapons.
The previous attack wasn’t completely effective
Additional Notes:
What was the rationale for the US entry to World War I?
Short version: Wilson asked Congress for war in April 1917 chiefly because Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare—attacking neutral shipping and killing Americans—which, he argued, violated international law and U.S. neutral rights. The Zimmermann Telegram (a German proposal to Mexico for an anti-U.S. alliance) sharpened the sense of direct threat. He framed the war as defending “the rights of all mankind” and making “the world…safe for democracy.” Office of the HistorianUniversity of Richmond BlogsNational Archives+1
What is the Sussex Pledge?
The Sussex Pledge was Germany’s formal promise to the United States on May 4, 1916—after a U-boat torpedoed the cross-Channel ferry SS Sussex—to curb submarine warfare against non-combatant shipping. In it, Germany agreed to follow traditional “visit and search” rules at sea, not attack passenger ships, and not sink merchant ships without warning and without first safeguarding passengers and crew. The U.S. accepted these assurances on May 8, 1916. Office of the Historian
Why it happened: The Sussex attack on March 24, 1916 (with dozens killed and several Americans wounded) triggered a U.S. ultimatum—Wilson warned he would sever relations unless Germany stopped attacking civilian shipping. The pledge was Berlin’s attempt to keep the U.S. neutral.
What it covered (in plain terms):
No attacks on passenger ships.
Merchant ships could be stopped and searched; only if contraband was found could they be destroyed—and only after placing passengers/crew in safety.
What happened next: Germany rescinded these limits and resumed unrestricted submarine warfare effective February 1, 1917, a key step that led Wilson to ask
What Wilson told the country (April 2, 1917)
Germany had announced it would “put aside all restraints of law or of humanity” and wage unrestricted U-boat war; neutral ships and lives were no longer safe. University of Richmond Blogs
The U.S. must fight for freedom of the seas, the rights of neutral nations, and a peace based on “political liberty”—“The world must be made safe for democracy.”
Britannica: The Germans, who had circulated warnings that the ship would be sunk, felt themselves fully justified in attacking a vessel that was furthering the war aims of their enemy. The German government also felt that, in view of the vulnerability of U-boats while on the surface and the British announcement of intentions to arm merchant ships
Q: How much did 4,200 cases of metallic cartridges, cases of shrapnel shells, fuses, etc weigh and how much space does it take up?
ChatGPT said:
Thought for 3m 57s
Here’s a tight, numbers-first answer using what we can document and then a transparent “how we got it.”
Bottom line (declared munitions on Lusitania, 1 May 1915)
Weight (gross, declared): ≈173 tons for the 4,200 cases of rifle/machine-gun cartridges plus 1,250 cases of 3-inch shrapnel shells (shell bodies) and the fuze cases shipped separately. WikipediaThe Library of CongressEncyclopedia Britannica
Space (approx.): ~120–130 m³ (≈4,200–4,600 ft³) for those same items, using standard WWI packaging dimensions (see methods below).
What the manifest actually says
A U.S. Customs report printed in the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States specifies Lusitania’s contraband items on that voyage as: 4,200 cases of metallic cartridges (.303 Mk VII, 1,000 per case, packed in 20-round cartons), 1,250 cases of “shrapnel,” 18 cases of fuzes, and a few sample shell castings. It also notes “5 pounds of powder to a thousand cartridges.” (The shrapnel cases and the fuzes were shipped without explosives.) Office of the Historian
How the weight pencils out
Documented total: Multiple summaries put the declared munitions at ≈173 tons. That figure covers all of the above (cartridges + shrapnel shells + fuzes). WikipediaThe Library of CongressEncyclopedia Britannica
Cross-check by components (cartridges only, order-of-magnitude):
4,200 cases × 1,000 rounds = 4.2 million rounds. Office of the Historian
A .303 Mk VII bullet is 174 grains ≈ 11.3 g; propellant averages ≈2.27 g per round (5 lb per 1,000, per U.S. Customs). Add case/primer mass and you get a loaded round of roughly 25–27 g. That implies ~105–113 metric tons for the cartridges themselves (before crates/dunnage). WikipediaOffice of the Historian
The 173-ton published total is therefore plausible once you add packaging plus the 1,250 crate-loads of shrapnel shells and the fuze cases. Wikipedia
Note on the shrapnel: the U.S. Customs memo says the 1,250 cases of shrapnel contained no fuzes and no explosives; the fuzes were cased separately. (Some later accounts dispute whether shells were “filled”; the Customs record is clear about no explosives in those consignments.) Office of the Historian
How the space pencils out (transparent assumptions)
To turn cases into cubic volume, we use period packaging dimensions from museums and manuals and keep a conservative margin for outer crates and void space.
Cartridges (4,200 cases)
Each case held 50 × 20-round cartons (to make 1,000). An IWM catalog entry gives a 20-round carton as 130 × 81.5 × 29.5 mm → 0.0003126 m³ per carton → ~0.01563 m³ (0.552 ft³) of inner cartons per 1,000-round case. Imperial War Museums
Add ~15–25% for wooden outer case and packing: ~0.63–0.69 ft³ per case. For 4,200 cases that’s ~2,665–2,900 ft³ = 75–82 m³.
Shrapnel shells (1,250 cases)
The British Field Service Pocket Book (1914; amended 1916) lists a 13-pdr QF box of 4 rounds at approx. 9.7″ × 9.7″ × 25.2″ (about 1.37 ft³ per case). Using that as a proxy for the 3-inch shrapnel shell crates, 1,250 cases ≈ 1,715 ft³ ≈ 48.6 m³. (These figures are drawn from the Pocket Book data as quoted in a collector’s forum thread that reproduces the table.) Great War Forum
Fuzes (18 cases)
The No. 80-series fuze is roughly 60 mm tall × 60 mm dia and weighs ~0.29–0.38 kg each. Even if the widely cited total count of ~3,240 fuzes is used, their combined volume is <1 m³ (before crate allowance) and their mass is ~1 t—negligible against totals. Imperial War MuseumsWikimedia CommonsWikipedia
Add them up:
Cartridges 75–82 m³ + Shrapnel ~48.6 m³ + Fuzes ~≤1–2 m³ = ≈120–130 m³ (≈4,200–4,600 ft³).
Sources at a glance
U.S. Customs/State Dept. (FRUS, June 4, 1915): exact consignments; .303 Mk VII; 1,000 per case; “5 lb powder per 1,000”; 1,250 cases shrapnel; 18 cases fuzes; no explosives in those consignments. Office of the Historian
Weight total (≈173 tons): widely cited summaries (Britannica; Library of Congress blog; Wikipedia WWI entry). Encyclopedia BritannicaThe Library of CongressWikipedia
Cartridge/bullet particulars: .303 Mk VII bullet mass (174 gr ≈ 11.3 g). Wikipedia
Carton dimensions: IWM object record for a .303 20-round box. Imperial War Museums
Shrapnel crate dimensions: Field Service Pocket Book data (quoted with exact figures). Great War Forum
» What was the threat level in the Dominican Republic (1965), in which the US aimed to prevent a communist takeover?
Short answer: low to moderate, not imminent. U.S. intelligence judged that Communists were present but were not in control of the 1965 revolt and posed no immediate takeover threat—the risk was seen as potential rather than acute.
A CIA-led Special National Intelligence Estimate (Jan. 17, 1964) concluded Dominican security forces could handle subversion and that “for the immediate future… the leftists pose no serious threat to seize control.” (Office of the Historian)
During the crisis, McGeorge Bundy cabled from Santo Domingo (May 22, 1965) that “on all the evidence I do not believe Communists now control the [rebel] general staff,” adding a Dominican interlocutor thought “the Communist issue was laughable.” (Office of the Historian)
Inside Washington, a May 6 task-force memo even urged officials to “thicken the case about the communists” for the press—indicating the public justification exceeded what intelligence could firmly show. (Office of the Historian)
Publicly, President Johnson framed the intervention as necessary “to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere” (May 2, 1965), but this overstated the immediacy suggested by internal assessments. (loveman.sdsu.edu)
Bottom line: There were Communist elements in the rebellion, but contemporaneous U.S. assessments did not find an imminent Communist takeover; the administration elevated the perceived threat in its public rationale. (Office of the Historian, loveman.sdsu.edu)
Isn’t it ironic that in 2003 the US went to war in Afghanistan, purportedly against al-Qaeda, after having supported their Mujahideen** predecessors in Afghanistan in a proxy war against the Soviet Union. In this on-again-off-again alliance with al-Qaeda and its mutations, we purported to want democracy in Iraq and Iran, but flip-flopped back to supporting terrorists in Syria.** (investigate leader bio )